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The entry of the United States into the World War brought at once
in its train the pressing questions of raising revenue to meet the war
expenses. Part of the funds necessary was raised by the various is-
sues of Liberty Bonds, and the rest was raised by a series of internal
taxes. As to the latter much reliance was placed upon the income tax
and so-called excess profits tax. The report of the Committee on
War Finance estimates that for the year i918 the receipts from these
two sources were approximately seventy-three per cent of the total
income derived from taxation.
1 The operation of the law, considered
in a broad way, was a success. Yet, after praising the result obtained,
the point is reached where just criticism begins.
2  The Act of Congress
of February 24, I919, deals in part with the subject "War Profits and
Excess Profits Tax."3 As now written and enacted the excess profits
tax applies only to corporations.
4  The Act of October 3, 1917, applied
in addition to individuals and to partnerships. In this respect the
present act is simpler in its workings than the former act. The excess
profits tax is the invention of the war, and is an ingenious expedient
'Report of Committee on War Finance (igig) 9 Am. Ecoi. REv. Supp. 2, at
P. 4: "For the fiscal year 1918 the receipts from these sources were approxi-
mately $2,84o,oooooo, which was over 73 per cent of the total income derived
from taxation ... it is evident that they were the mainstay of our war
finances."
'Edwin R. A. Seligman, The War Revenue Act (1918) 33 PoL. Scr. QuAP. I,
32: "The third and most important drawback is the unfortunate principle 
adopted
in the. elaboration of the excess-profits tax ... The law will in all probability be
found to be almost unworkable."
Professor Robert Murray Haig, The Revenue Act of 1918 (919) 34 POL. ScL.
QuAR. 369, 382: "The Excess Profits Tax Law of 1917 was probably as de-
servedly unpopular as any tax measure could well be . . . It was unfair in its
scope, uneven in its application, and so poorly drafted. that only by the boldest
administrative action could it be made to function at all."
Hon. Carter Glass, Secy. of Treasury, Report to Congress (Dec. i919):
"Still more objectionable is the operation of the excess profits tax in 
peace
times."
'Title III, secs. 300-337. The Act was styled "An Act to Provide 
Revenue
and for other purposes," in contradistinction to the Act it amended, 
that of
October 3, 1917, which was styled "An Act to Provide Revenue to 
defray War
Expenses and for other purposes."
'Act of February 24, i919, sec. 301.
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devised to reach, not profits resulting from war industries, but to tax
the excess during the war over ordinary profits.
5
It is the purpose of this paper to discuss the puzzling phrase,
"invested capital," as defined in section 326 of the present act6 : "...
(3) paid in or earned surplus and undivided profits, not including sur-
plus and undivided profits earned during the year." For all present
purposes this phrase and that in the Act of October 3, 1917, are the
same. 7  The important point is the computation of "capital," the Act
using the term "invested capital." The greater the amount of "invested
capital" as compared with a given income, the smaller will be the
percentage and tax.
It will be noted at once that the Act lacks definition. "Paid in or
earned surplus and undivided profits," are not defined, either in the Act
of October 3, 1917, nor in the present law. This lack of definition was
attempted to be supplied by action of the Treasury Department, and
accordingly, as early as November 8, 1917, Daniel C. Roper, Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue, sent throughout the country a request
for suggestions as to the methods of computing the amount to be
used as invested capital." So too, a substantially similar statement
was made by Secretary McAdoo himself in announcing the per-
sonnel of the Excess Profits Advisory Board, appointed under the
Act of October 3, 1917.' One of the net results of this action of the
'(1919) 9 Am. Ecox. Rxv. Supp. 2, at p. 16: "The Treasury recommended.
an alternative system . . . by which two taxes should be computed, one upon
the present excess profits principle and the other upon the war profits principle
adopted by Great Britain, which bases the tax upon the excess of the profits
realized in the taxab~le year above the average profits realized during a series
of years prior to the war; with a provision that the higher of the two amounts
thus determined should be the amount of the tax actually assessed." See also
Plehn, War Profits and Excess Profits Taxes (192o) IO Am.. Ecoiy. REv. 283,
285: "The war profits tax which soon evolved into the excess profits tax, was
first proposed in 1915 in Denmark and Sweden." By 1917, thirteen countries had
been invaded by this tax.
'Act of February 24, 1919, sec. 326: "(a) That as used in this title the term
"invested capital" for any year means (except as provided in subdivisions (b)
and (c) of this section) : (I) Actual cash bona fide paid in for stock or shares.
(2) Actual cash value of tangible property, other than cash, bona fide paid in
for stock or shares at the time of such payment . . . (4) Intangible property
bona fide paid in for stock or shares prior to March 3, 1917... (5) Intangible
property bona fide paid in for stock or shares on or after March 3, 1917. • ."
"See Act of October 3, 1917, sec. 207: ". .. (3) Paid in or earned surplus
and undivided profits used or employed in the business, exclusive of undivided
profits earned during the taxable year."
"'Treasury Department, Washington, November 8, 1917, Sir: . . . You are
particularly requested to outline the method of computing 'invested capital' under
sections 201, :o4, 207, and 208 of the Excess Profits Tax Law, which would be
most practicable and accurate. Illustrations in actual cases showing the applica-
tion will be gladly received. .."
Official Bulletin, Nov. 14, 1917 (the government daily publication).
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Treasury Department is the general exclusion of appreciation from
the value of capital assets as invested capital."' Under the present
Act the Treasury Department has ruled that "the fair market value of
the assets as of March i, 1913, has no bearing on invested capital."
'11
In passing the i9i9 Act, Congress has written into the new law some
of the more important of the administrative rulings which the Treasury
Department evolved in efforts to make the 1917 Act reasonable and
equitable. 12 At the time of the passage of the present Act the Depart-
ment regulation discussed here had been evolved, and the claim is made
for it that it now has the force of law by reason of the remarks of
Senator Simmons, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, when
the Senate draft of the present Act was presented.
3
It is interesting to note that an amendment was offered in the House
of Representatives on September 3, 1918, to section 326, to exclude the
increase in value above the original cost until such increase was actually
realized by sale."4 This amendment passed the House but was struck
out by the Senate Finance Committee on December 15, 1918, and the
Act as finally passed on February 24, i919, does not contain it.
Notwithstanding these rulings of the Treasury Department and the
remarks of Senator Simmons, it is believed that the question of what
constitutes invested capital under the phrase "paid in or earned sur-
plus and undivided profits" is not foreclosed against the taxpayer. An
effort has been made to have the Court of Claims hold to that effect,
but that Court has upheld the regulation.
5
1,U. S. INT. Rnv. REGuIATioNS 41 (,917) art. 42: " If value appreciation
of a kind not subject to income tax, (other than that allowed under article 55)
has been taken up in the accounts a deduction must be made in respect of such
appreciation so taken up..."
'U. S. INT. REv. REGuLATIONS 45 (i918) arts. 831, 838.
See Haig, op. cit. note 2, at p. 383.
'Report of the Committee on Firmnce, U. S. Senate (S. Rept. 617, 65th Cong.,
3d sess.) Ii: "Speaking generally, assets are valued, for the purpose of deter-
mining invested capital, at the price paid in acquiring them, without recognition
of subsequent appreciation. Weighty arguments have been presented in favor
of abandoning this rule, and valuing property acquired before March 1, 1913, as
of that date. But the Committee believes that such a method would be imprac-
ticable; that it would impose upon the Treasury Department the impossible
task of valuing nearly a'll of the durable property of the country as of a date
nearly six years in the past. The present statutory rule works well in a large
majority of cases. The remaining cases in which it works injustice, can and
should be cared for by adequate relief provisions which the Committee has
carefully formulated and recommends."
11 H. R. x2863.
"This case is not yet reported; see (i92o, Ct. Cl.) 38 Treas. Dec. (August
5, ig2o) i9. .. . "The court's conclusions are: (i) That the act in question
(4o Stat., 3o6) undertakes to define "invested capital" and the averments of the
petition cannot be said to bring the plaintiff's case within the definition of
section 2o7. (2) That the increase in value of plaintiff's ore lands, which was
first declared to be surplus, and afterwards treated as the basis of a stock
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At the time of the passage of the Act of February 24, 1919, and of
the Act of October 3, 1917, each using the phrase "paid in or earned
surplus and undivided profits," there was no fixed, definite terminology
by which the phrase "earned surplus and undivided profits" might be
said to exclude value appreciation in the estimation of capital assets.
It remained for the Treasury Department to exclude such value by
regulations. Such exclusion cannot be pitched upon current knowledge
of accounting as then existing. It is clear that the terms as then used
in that science included actual value appreciation."6 In fact, the term
"surplus" and "undivided profits" are terms of interchangeable mean-
ing 7 And surplus usually means surplus of assets over liabilities, and
corporate profits means profits available for dividends.1 8
Stress is pla:ced upon the apparent uniform meaning and use of
terminology in this well-known science of economics and finance, be-
cause it is a well-recognized rule that language in a statute is to be given
its ordinary meaning, 9 when such construction will not defeat the mani-
fest intention of the legislating body.
But the rule of construction of the statute need not be exclusively
drawn from that ordinary meaning given in economics and finance.
Resort may be had successfully to the accepted definitions of the courts,
including no less authority than the Supreme Court of the United
States. These decisions uniformly recognize that appreciation in value
dividend, did not thereby become earned surplus or individual profits or invested
capital within the meaning of the act of I91i ."The stock dividend added nothing
to, and took nothing from, the corporation's invested capital. (3) That the
inequalities, which can arise in the application of the statnte to particular cases,
can not be corrected by judicial construction, where the enactment is otherwise
valid. (4) That where the act is ambiguous or uncertain, the construction of it
by the administrative officers charged with its execution is entitled to great
respect"
" See for definitions of appreciation and surplus, Year Book (igog, Am. Ass.
of Pub. Acc.) 161, 179; Year Book (1911, Am. Ass. of Pub. Acc.) x24; Arthur
Lowes Dickenson, address delivered Sept. 27, 19o4, before the Congress of
Accountants at St Louis on the subject, The Profits of a Corporation ("In the
widest possible view profits may be stated as the realized increment in value
of the whole amount invested in an undertaking; and conversely loss is the
realized decrement in such value. . . . In other words every appreciation of
assets is a profit, and every depreciation a loss..."); 22 Greendlinger, Financial
and Business Statements, 196.
' See R. J. Bennett, Corporation Accounting (1917) 334 sec. 291; Joseph
Paul Esquerr6, The Applied Theory of Accounts (1917) 30; Joseph J. Kline,
Elements of Accounting, 174, 254; Samuel F. Racine, Accounting Principles,
191.
" Arthur Lowes Dickinson, Accounting Practice and Procedure (1917) 62.
"Levy v. McCartee (1832, U. S.) 6 Pet. 1O2, i1O, by Mr. Justice Story: "The
legislature must be presumed to use words in their known and ordinary signi-
fication unless that sense be repelled by the context"; Eisner v. Macomber (1920)
252 U. S. I89 -, 4o Sup. Ct 189, 193: words are to be construed "as used in
common speech."
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of capital assets constitutes value, for purposes of taxation,
20 stock
dividends,21 capital additions,
22 sale of assets, 23 for rate-making pur-
poses,24 and for condemnation purposes.
25  A dividend is only to be
declared out of profits. "Accumulated profits," a term occasionally
used, is another method of speaking of "surplus."
28
As earned, profits may be distributed. Are we to speak of another
class of profits as "acquired," as distinguished from "earned" or "paid
in"? And after all what boots it by what method the profits are
earned 'U ntil actually severed, the corporation has full and com-
plete title to them and dominion over them, and the power to treat them
as capital and use them as such in its business.
27  The statute in ques-
tion does not require the earnings of a corporation to be severed from
its other assets; so long as the particular item comes within the desig-
nation as either earned surplus or undivided profits, the right to treat
it as invested capital is preserved.
Value appreciation certainly represents a "profit." If not an earn-
ing, what is it? Value exists, against which the corporation can issue
dividends, and if it is not a profit, it is hard to conceive in what class to
place it.28  A dividend may be in stock, and yet represent profit.
Profits may be distributed as earned. They may be in whole or in part
retained and utilized for the corporate advantage. They may never be
distributed but permanently used in the business.
2 9  "Profits" is a term
of decision in the Supreme Court of the United States.
30 They con-
'People v. Coleman (i89i) 126 N. Y. 433, 27 N. E. 818, 2 L. R. A. 762, note.
'Minot v. Paine (1868) 99 Mass. ioi; McGinnis v. O'Cdnner (igog) iix Md.
.695, 72 AtI. 614; 2 Cook, Corporations (7th ed. 1913), sec. 536; Williams v.
Western Union Tel. Co. (1883) 93 N. Y. 162, 188: " . . . Its capital stock may
be reduced below the amount limited by its charter; but whatever property it
has up to that limit must be regarded as its capital stock When its property
exceeds that limit, then the excess is surplus. Such surplus belongs to the
corporation and is a portion of its property, and, in a general sense, may be
regarded as a portion of its capital, but in a strictly legal sense it is not a portion
of its capital, and is always regarded as surplus profits."
' Towne v. Eisner (1918) 245 U. S. 418, 38 Sup. Ct. 158; Southern Pacific v.
Lowe (1918) 247 U. S. 330, 38 Sup. Ct. 54o; Lynch v. Hornby (igi8) 247 U. S.
339, 38 Sup. Ct 543; Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co. (igi8) 247 U. S. 179, 38 Sup. Ct
467 (stumpage case).
=Mangham v. State (1912) 11 Ga. App. 440, 75 S. E. 5o8.
'Re Hinton Water Light and Supply Co. (1919, W. Va. Pub. Ser. Com.)
P. U. R. i9xgD, 467.
"2 Lewis, Eminent Domain (3d ed. 19o9) sec. 706 and cases cited.
,Gibbons v. Mahon (189o) 136 U. S. 549, 10 Sup. Ct. 057.
"Security Trust Co. v. Rammelsburg (igi8) 82 W. Va. 701, 97 S. E. 122.
See Hite's Devisees v. Hite's Executors (1892) 93 Ky. 257, 20 S. W. 778.
Hemenway v. Hemenway (19o2) I8I Mass. 4o6, 63 N. E. 919; see also Eisner
v. Macomber, supra note 19.
'Mr. Justice Jackson in Mobile and Ohio Ry. v. Tennessee (1894) 253 U. S.
486, 497, 14 Sup. Ct. 968, 971 : "The term 'profits,' out of which dividends above
can properly be declared, denotes what remains after defraying every expense,
including loans falling due, as well as the interest on such loans."
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stitute the clear gain of any business venture after deducting the capital
invested in the business, the expenses incurred in its conduct, and the
losses sustained in its prosecution."'
If the ordinary meaning of language as used and known in terms of
finance, economics, and law, is not to control the construction of the
act, and it is to be assumed that the language is capable of a fluidity of
construction, still the taxpayer must be favored by the courts.3 2 All
the revenue acts of Congress are to be looked to as parts of one
system.33
Let us suppose that a corporation is formed with five thousand shares
of capital stock of the par value of one hundred dollars each. In i9oo
it acquires for $ioo,ooo, ore lands, which gradually increase in value,
until in 1912 bona fide offers of purchase are made to it at a price of
$I,OOO,OOO. Instead of selling, the corporation, prior to March I, 1913,
intcreases its authorized capital stock and then capitalizes the value
appreciation, by declaring a stock dividend of $9oo,ooo. In making
its return of income and excess profits tax for 1917, the return of
invested capital of the corporation includes the $9oo,ooo appreciation
against which the stock was issued. The Treasury Department under
its regulations strikes from the invested capital of the corporation the
$9oo,ooo appreciation, notwithstanding that the value exists represent-
ing the $9oo,ooo.
There are men now living who purchased Iowa farms fifty years ago
for no more than three dollars per acre, which are now worth five
hundred dollars per acre. To say that such an original purchaser of
one hundred acres must treat his invested capital as three hundred
dollars, while a neighbor who has an identical farm for which he paid
five hundred dollars per acre, can treat his invested capital as $50,000,
is to argue that if the heirs of the original purchaser of Manhattan
Island still held it, the total invested capital would be $24, on the
theory that that was the sum paid to the Indians.
The "appreciation" in the hypothetical corporation case became sur-
plus and was capitalized by the declaration of a stock dividend. The
surplus was available for dividends, and when by corporate action it
became part of the corporate capital, it was withdrawn as a fund out
of which dividends could thereafter be paid. Dividends are not per-
mitted to impair capital. So long as there is a surplus, there are funds
available for dividends, whether that surplus comes from appreciations
in value or from business operations of the corporation. The declara-
tion of a stock dividend takes out of surplus what was before surplus
"Park v. Grant Loco. Works (1885) 40 N. J. Eq. 114, 3 Atl. 16z; 4 Thompson,
Corporations (2d ed. 1911) sec. 5307; 2 Cook, Corporations (7th ed. 1913)
sec. 536.
See Gould v. Gould (1917) 245 U. S. 151, 153, 38 Sup. Ct. 53.
"Black, Income Taxation (1913) secs. 30, 31 and cases cited; Wetmore v.
Markoe (904) 196 U. S. 68, 25 Sup. Ct. 172.
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and puts it in the capital account, and a permanent addition to the
capital is the result. "Once capital, always capital." Does it become
"invested capital" to be included as a part of the amount on which the
corporation may figure its 7, 8, or 9 per cent. of deduction? A dis-
tinction may be apparent between the case of capitalized appreciation,
and appreciation not capitalized. In the former case it has been car-
ried to and through the surplus account; in the latter it may never have
reached the surplus account, although in a recent case in the Supreme
Court the appreciation was not entered on the books.
a3
The hypothetical case differs only in its details from that of many
corporations now engaged in business in the United States. Especially
is this true with the so-called "close" corporations, begun years ago
with nominal capitals, which by successful business judgment and
sound principles have become of great value at the present time. How
frequently in the United States have corporations begun business with
small capitals, which, because "the enterprise was happily chosen and
skillfully conducted,"3' 4 have increased in value from time to time
through additions by way of appreciation of capital assets, against
which years ago, perhaps, stock dividends have been declared?, Yet, if
the regulations of the Treasury Department are upheld, these corpora-
tions are subject to the rule that the value appreciations must be ex-
cluded or, as stated in the regulations, "invested capital within the
meaning of the statute is the capital actually paid in to the corporation
by the stock-holders, including the surplus and undivided profits, and
is not based upon the present net worth of the assets."3 5
When one comes to analyze the tax burdens placed upon corpora-
tions by this excess profits law, he finds that certain kinds of apprecia-
tion in value are recognized and allowed by the Treasury Department
regulations. If the taxpayer has gone through a form of procedure
recognized by the Treasury Department, the value of the "value appre-
ciation" in the capital assets is allowed as an item upon which the
deduction can be claimed. A few of the permissible methods under the
regulations are given in the examples following, in each of which it is
believed that appreciation is allowed under the Act of Congress as
construed by the Treasury Department:
i. If when the ore lands (in the hypothetical case) are acquired,
the company has gone through the process of issuing preferred stock
to the amount of their actual cash value at that time, to wit, $iooooo,
and in addition has issued watered stock to the amount of $9ooooo, and
if by January I, 1914, there has been an appreciation of $9oo,ooo, *this
appreciation can be included in invested capital. Now if the issue of
this additional stock is postponed until 1912, when the appreciation has
'a See Doyle v. Mitchell Bros., supra, note 22.
"4People v. Coleman (i8gi) 126 N. Y. 433, 443, 27 N. E. 81g, 82o.
"U. S. INT. REV. REGULATIONs 45 (ig18) art. 831.
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been demonstrated, and then is struck out as invested capital, a peculiar
kind of high financing is favored.
2. If the company has sold the ore lands for $iooo,ooo, of course
the appreciation could be included, for in that case appreciation becomes
"earned surplus." But it is evident that the mere sale does not create
the surplus. The profit has been accruing over a long period of years.
Conversion into cash does not create the profit, and in fact a conver-
sion into cash is not necessary.
3. If the lands have been traded for other ore lands precisely similar,
which had a market value of $i,oooooo, then this is a realization of
the profit in the original ore lands, and the invested capital on account
of the substituted ore lands would be $iooo,ooo.
4. If the company has distributed these lands to its shareholders
acre by acre in the year 1912, and the stockholders have then re-con-
veyed those ore lands to the company in payment for $i,oooooo of
stock, this again would constitute a payment in of these lands in
exchange for shares, and therefore the company could claim that
amount of invested capital.
5. If at the time of the stock dividend in 1912, the lawyers in
charge of the matter have advised the Company that because of tech-
nical difficulties it should go through the form of chartering a new
company to which all assets would be transferred, the stockholders of
the old company to own pro rata the shares of the new company, then
this, too, would cause the new company to have an invested capital
based upon the market value of the ore lands.
6. If in 19oo the individual stockholders have acquired these ore
lands at $ioo,ooo and turned them into the company for $I,ooo,ooo,
par value of its stock, even though in ioo the $iooooo represented
only the property's then market value or worth, still since that property
so exchanged or paid in for stock on March I, 1913, was worth
$I,OOO,OOO, the latter figure and not the $ioo,ooo has to be used (be
usable) in the calculation of the Company's "invested capital." se
To Senator Simmons' remarks in the Senate of the United States
that "speaking generally, assets are values for the purpose of determin-
ing invested capital at the prices paid in acquiring them, without recog-
nition of subsequent appreciation, ' 3 7 the answer is that his statement is
only partly true. There then existed approved regulations by which
"These examples may be emphasized by reference to an article by Prof.
T. S. Adams of Yale University, former Chairman of the Excess Profits Tax
Advisory Board of the Treasury Department, Needed Tax Reform in the United
States in the New York Evening Post (reprinted i92o, especially at p. 8).
Another writer has similar comments to make. A. A. Ballantine, Some Consti-
tutional Aspects of the Excess Profits Tax (1920) 29 YALE LAw JouRNAL, 625,
626: "The method adopted in the statute operates to produce for enterprises
similarly circumstanced in every respect, except that of cash or cash value paid
or left in against stock, tax burdens which are materially different."
' Supra note 13.
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subsequent appreciation was recognized as invested capital,-for the
purpose of the deduction allowed in the Excess Profits Tax Law. Some
of these devices have been mentioned here, and it becomes apparent that
Professor Adams is correct in saying that "the tax thus depend.s largely
upon the mere form and manner of organization, upon chance and
accident; it is unequal and capricious, it penalizes conservative finance,
and it rewards stock-watering.... It is a common thing for a million
dollars or more in taxes to turn on some fine-spun distinction, about
which nearly as much can be said upon one side as upon the other."
The Treasury Department, however, by regulation has attempted
to retain for itself the right in particularly difficult cases to afford relief
against its own regulation excluding appreciation, by reconstructing
"invested capital." This is also a concession by the Department that
the Act does not warrant the exclusion of appreciation. There is no
reason for distinction of classes in taxpayers, for whether the Act
includes or excludes value appreciation, the harshness of its operation
is not to be set aside by the Treasury Department when its exercise rests
upon no rule of certainty, and involves the exercise of discretion by
administrative officers.
38
The form of the transaction should not be the criterion to establish
whether or not appreciation is to be included as invested capital.
The exemption is supposedly based on the taxpayer's invested capital;
this means, of course, the taxpayers capital.
If by its definition of the term, or otherwise, Congress has sought to
differentiate between portions of that capital-the part earned from
manufacturiig activities, for example, from the part, if any, accrued
from other sources-it has made a classification which amounts in effect
to a direct tax upon that part of the taxpayer's capital excluded by such
differentiation. This results in a tax upon property because of owner-
ship, which requires apportionrYent under the Constitution.
9
See Committee on War Finance, (igig) 9 Am. EcoN. REV. SJPP. 2, at p. 2:
"In its published regulations the Treasury Department after enumerating various
cases to which section 210 was clearly applicable, held that the section might
be invoked in cases where 'the invested capital is seriously disproportionate to
the taxable income'; which cases might arise through 'the realization in one
year of the earnings of capital unproductively invested through a period of years
or of the fruits of activities antedating the taxable year,' as well as through
inability to allow properly for 'amortization, obsolescence, or exceptional depre-
ciation' of war plants. Thus the section was made applicable to cases in which
the invested capital could be determined not only with satisfactory, but with
deadly accuracy, a somewhat extraordinary result. From every practical foint
of view, however, the ruling was extremely fortunate, because it enabled the
Department to give relief in cases where the power to tax involved not only
the "power to destroy" but the actual exercise of that power. It appears that
under this interpretation of section 2IO the department has reconstructed
the capital of no inconsiderable number of concerns with a view to reducing
to a reasonable figure the taxable income in excess of the authorized deduction."
' Pollock v. Farners Loan & Trust Co. (1895) 158 U. S. 6oi, IS Sup. Ct. 912;
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Again, by making a distinction between taxpayers because of the
sources from which their property (capital) is derived, and levying a
heavier tax on one than on the other, the basis of cost is an unreason-
able classification of taxpayers, void under the due process clause of
the Fifth Amendment.
39a
These matters may perhaps be made clear by an illustration.
Bank A in New York began business in 184o; it acquired a location
at the corner of Broad and Wall Streets for which it paid $1oo,ooo;
by 1917 its location over the period of years had increased in value to
$1,ooo,ooo; the land was taxed to it at that sum; similar pieces of
property in the vicinity had sold at that figure or more. Bank B began
business in 1916 in New York and acquired a site near that of the for-
mer and expended $i,oooooo in so doing. To say under these circum-
stances that for purposes of "invested capital" the capital of A must be
taken at $ioo,ooo and that of B at $1,ooo,ooo is obviously such an
arbitrary discrimination as at once to make its unreasonableness ap-
parent as a classification of the taxpayers. It means further that
$9oo,ooo of the Capital of bank A is to be disregarded and the full
earnings of $i,ooo,ooo of bank B are not to be taxed. This in effect is
a direct tax requiring apportionment.
Earned surplus and undivided profits may consist of value increment,
as well as revenue from operations. "Earned" is merely contrasted
with "paid in" in the statute. An increment in value is not "paid in,"
but that does not say that it is not earned; it is "earned" in contempla-
tion of law as well as of business, if in fac it exists and is not paid in.
This seems so obvious that a mere statement should suffice. The ordi-
nary contrasting terms as applied to surplus are "paid in" and "earned,"
the former applying to something the share holder has himself contri-
buted (as he did his capital), and the latter applying to all other surplus
and not so contributed. The latter may be derived from the opera-
tions of the company's ordinary business, from the sale of its capital
assets or part thereof, or from many other sources. To say that bona
fide actual appreciations in a company's properties may be counted in
calculating its earned surplus oNLY when that appreciation has been
determined by a sale of the properties, is to beg the question. The
sale is only a detail, a method of determining the fact; the fact, how-
ever, is and remains the fact, whether so determined or otherwise
demonstrated. The idea of "an unearned increment" does not bear
upon the question at all; that would be equally present whether there
were a sale or not, and, as is conceded, if there be a sale, the realized
enhancement is "earned" whether the whole appreciation over cost be
due to company activity, or is wholly due to the growth of the com-
munity or the growing scarcity of the kind of property, with all of
which the Company had nothing to do. It is obvious from this, that the
'a Gast & Co. v. Schneider (1916) 240 U. S. 55, 36 Sup. Ct. 400.
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use of the words "earned surplus" in the statute are not intended to
have a meaning different from the usual one, and they are usually used
to mean all surplus not paid in, and hence include bona fide property
appreciation taken up in the accounts of the taxpayer if actually then
existing. There is no exclusive test to determine the existence of the
enhancement (such as a sale) provided by the Act, and there is no sug-
gestion of the exclusion of the value increment taken up in the books
of the taxpayer, if in fact the value be then existing. The first inti-
mation of that requirement came from the Treasury Regulations; it
needs no comment further than to say that if the Act does not author-
ize or require such a test, as the sole test, the Treasury Department
cannot restrict the determination of what is actual surplus to any such
narrow basis.
If it be urged that the expression in the Act of one case of property
paid in for stock is the exclusion of appreciation in all other instances,
under the maxim "expressio unius exclusio alterius," the answer is
that this maxim is 6verborne by the rule which forbids a construction
that renders the act invalid if there be any reasonable one which does
not. This brings us to the point that it is unreasonably arbitrary and
discriminatory, particularly in the matter of a tax based, after all, on
what the taxpayer earns on his property, to provide that the incomes of
two properties which are of the same kind and are of identical worth
on March I, 1913, for example, and which in the taxable year produce
identically the same amount of income, must nevertheless pay taxes at
different rates. The "excess profits" tax, in theory at least, proceeds, or
should proceed in order to be uniform, on the basis of a percentage on
the amount "in excess" of a certain reasonable or standard profit; one
owning $Ioo,ooo worth of property when the law became effective
should pay no more than another who at the same time owned $ioo,ooo
worth of the same property, and no less. Yet by making tlie test, not
the value when the law became effective, but the original cost, the
effect, if such cost be the lower, is to confiscate pro tanto the taxpayer's
property, for it amounts to pro tanto depriving him of all income there-
from. Is this not the situation alluded to by Mr. justice White in a
case under the Spanish War Tax Law? "If a case should ever
arise where an arbitrary and confiscatory exaction is imposed bearing
the guise of a progressive or any other form of tax, it will be time
enough to consider whether the judicial power can afford a remedy
by applying inherent and fundamental principles for the protection of
the individual, even though there be no express authority in the consti-
tution to do so. ..,40
'Knowlton v. Moore (19oo) 178 U. S. 41, 109, 20 Sup. Ct. 747, 774.
